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In this paper we construct a theoretical model of spatial banking competition that 
considers the differential information among banks and potential borrowers in order 
to investigate how market structure affects the lending behavior of banks and their 
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in turn, encourages the entry of new customers in the loan market. Also, that the 
transportation cost that potential borrowers have to pay in order to reach the bank of 
their interest is decreased with the degree of competitiveness. Importantly, we 
demonstrate that market structure exerts a considerable positive effect on banks’ 
incentives to screen their loan applicants since banks are found to invest more in 
screening as competition in the market becomes higher. This is to say, banks resort to 
screening that serves as a buffer mechanism against bad credit which entails higher 
risk and which is more likely under competitive conditions. Overall, our findings 
provide support to a rather close link between the degree of competition, bank lending 
activity, and the investment of banks in screening technology. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the main tasks of banks is to mitigate the informational asymmetries which characterize 
credit markets. Indeed, banks have incomplete information regarding the creditworthiness of 
their loan applicants as they can neither observe their individual characteristics nor view their 
actions. To alleviate this information problem, banks can engage in an arm’s length relation with 
their creditors and protect their credit with collateral, or enter a control-oriented relationship 
where they can manage credit by conducting credit evaluations which are based on the gathering 
and processing of valuable information regarding applicants’ characteristics. The initiative of 
banks to rectify informational asymmetries by acquiring private information about the quality of 
heterogeneous would-be borrowers is widely known as screening.  
Following the profound changes in the competitive structure of the banking industry in recent 
years due to the deregulation process and technological advances, much attention has been lately 
paid -both in the theoretical and empirical literature- to the relevance of market conditions in the 
pre-lending screening function of banks. Consistently, Manove et al. (2001) develop a model 
where banks make a choice between screening the potential borrowers and asking them to pledge 
collateral.
1
 The posting of collateral by borrowers induces banks to overlook screening even 
though they receive a very accurate signal regarding applicant’s creditworthiness. In high levels 
of competition, the incentives of borrowers to post collateral increase and this makes banks very 
reluctant to engage in screening. In the context of creditworthiness tests, Cetorelli and Peretto 
(2000) demonstrate that, as the number of competitors in the banking market declines, the value 
added that banks attain from screening becomes larger. Simply stated, competition negatively 
affects banks’ willingness to generate information, a view that is perfectly in line with that of 
Manove et al. (2001). In a similar vein, Hauswald and Marquez (2006) construct a spatial model 
of banking competition where the quality of a bank’s information-acquisition process decreases 
as the distance separating the borrower from the bank is getting higher. They find that harsh 
competition -measured in terms of the bank-borrower distance- erodes bank rents and squeezes 
the resources that lenders devote to screen their applicants. As a consequence, banks become 
more vulnerable in taking faulty lending decisions. Lehner and Schnitzer (2008) also rely on a 
spatial competition model to examine how the entry of foreign banks affects the behavior of their 
local counterparts in markets that are characterized by different degrees of liberalization. They 
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show that intensified competition due to de novo entry of foreign banks tends to lower the 
incentives of domestic banks to invest in screening technology.  
However, not all studies in the relevant literature report a negative impact of competition on 
banks’ incentives to screen their applicant borrowers. For instance, Hainz et al. (2008) study how 
competition affects the use of collateral in bank credit markets obtaining results that move to the 
opposite direction of those of Manove et al. (2001). More concretely, they point out that 
enhanced competition lowers the presence of collateral by making screening more attractive. Put 
otherwise, they find that the reduction of loan rates due to higher competition is accompanied by 
an increase in bank screening activity. Along the same lines, Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr 
(1999) employ a competition model à la Hotelling to show that competition strengthens the 
incentives of banks to screen their potential borrowers. As argued in their paper, this can be 
explained by the fact that banks compete more aggressively for the most profitable applicants.  
Interestingly, some other studies are not capable of documenting a robust link between the 
market structure of the banking sector and the incentives of banks to obtain information about 
the creditworthiness of their loan applicants through screening. Dell’ Arricia (2000), for 
example, shows that this relationship varies depending on which of the following two opposite 
effects prevails. On the one hand, fierce competition aggravates the adverse selection problem 
that banks face pushing them to invest more in screening. On the other hand, more competition is 
linked to higher incentives for banks to deviate from a screening equilibrium, as the extra market 
share for a deviating bank becomes larger. It therefore turns out that the sign of the examined 
relationship is determined by the relative strength of the above two contradictory effects. 
Likewise, Gehrig (1998) investigates the incentives of banks to produce information by allowing 
them to choose the level of their screening effort. A rather ambiguous and inconclusive result on 
the relationship between competition and screening is again highlighted. In particular, Gehrig 
concludes that the direction of this relationship depends on the decision of banks to detect good 
or bad investment projects.    
In brief, it seems that there is no consensus in the extant literature on the relationship that 
holds between market structure and banks’ willingness to screen loan applicants. It is the aim of 
this paper to shed more light on this issue. Towards this aim, we consider the differential 
information among intermediaries and borrowers to investigate how bank market structure 
affects the lending behavior of banks and their incentives to invest in information acquisition 
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through screening. We follow the recent theoretical literature on banking industry structure and 
informational asymmetries (see, e.g., Dell’Ariccia, 2001; Hyytinen, 2003; Hauswald and 
Marquez, 2006; Lehner and Schnitzer, 2008) and consider a spatial model of competition à la 
Salop (1979), where banks and potential loan customers are located symmetrically around a 
circle.
2
 Under this structure, the two classes of players are differentiated on the basis of their 
location on the circle. Banks compete in prices for entrepreneurial customers who are endowed 
with an investment project that requires external funding. Entrepreneurs are of the following two 
extreme types: either ‘good’ with high-quality projects, or ‘bad’ with low-quality projects. The 
game between the players is essentially static and consists of two stages: in Stage 1 banks 
employ a costly screening mechanism to distinguish good from bad projects in order to offer 
credit as appropriate. The amount of investment in screening depends on the level of competition 
and determines the price of credit. Then, in Stage 2, entrepreneurs view bank offers and travel to 
the bank that satisfies their type to apply for loan.  
Our analysis lends support to the view that, when a bank reduces its lending rates, it succeeds 
in extending its share in the market. This is made by ‘poaching’ customers from its rivals that 
turn out to be relatively more expensive. It is also demonstrated that an increase in competition 
lowers the equilibrium loan rates rendering credit cheaper for all types of entrepreneurs. In 
simple terms, more entrepreneurs with either good or bad investment projects enter the loan 
market due to harsher competition. It is further found that when the market structure of the 
banking industry resembles perfect competition, the traveling cost of borrowers becomes 
irrelevant in the setting of the optimal loan rate. Importantly, it is showed in our analysis that 
competition strengthens the incentives of banks to engage in screening activity. In fact, we argue 
that screening is the device that banks use to protect their operation against bad credit, which 
entails higher risk and which is more likely under increased competition. On the whole, we 
demonstrate that market structure, bank lending behavior, and the willingness of banks to invest 
in screening technology are strongly interrelated with each other.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model of interbank 
competition in the loan market with banks engaged in screening activity. Section 3 characterizes 
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the equilibrium and presents the main results of our analysis. The implications of the results are 
then discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.   
 
 
2. Basic framework of the model 
As already mentioned, our analysis relies on a model of spatial competition à la Salop (1979). 
More particularly, we consider a banking market with two classes of players: banks and 
entrepreneurs. Both players are risk-neutral and live for one period, which is composed of two 
stages: Stage 1 and Stage 2. Entrepreneurs are located symmetrically around a circle of length 1, 
and their total mass is normalized to 1. Each entrepreneur is endowed with an indivisible project 
that requires an investment of a fixed amount of one unit of money. We assume that 
entrepreneurs have no initial wealth so that if a project is to be initiated, entrepreneurs must 
obtain credit from banks (thus, the term ‘entrepreneurs’ will be used interchangeably with that of 
‘borrowers’ in what follows).  
An investment project either succeeds with probability ]1,0(p  yielding a stochastic return 
R(pθ)>1
3
 or fails with probability p1  and returns nothing.
4
 The parameter θ describes 
entrepreneurs’ type and takes the following two values: },{ lh , where h stands for experienced and 
skilful entrepreneurs with high-quality projects, whereas l represents entrepreneurs who are less 
qualified and have low-quality projects. Consequently, it holds that ph>pl and 1)()(  lh pRpR , 
which imply that good projects have a higher probability of success and produce higher returns if 
compared with bad projects. We thus obtain that )()( llhh pRppRp  , which shows that the 
expected returns of a good project are always higher than the expected returns of a bad project.  
The fraction of good entrepreneurs is equal to q (0<q<1), where q is assumed to be common 
knowledge. That is, both parties know that in each point of the circle’s periphery there is a mass 
q of h-type entrepreneurs and a mass (1-q) of l-type entrepreneurs. As regards the two-point 
distribution of θ, we assume that it is public information. However, θ per se is observable only to 
entrepreneurs in the beginning of Stage 1. That is, entrepreneurs are aware of the quality of their 
own projects, whereas this information is not known to banks. Yet, banks have the expertise to 
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 The return must be higher than 1 (unit of money) in order the entrepreneur to have an incentive to invest in the 
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 This is to say, pθ  is the repayment (success) probability of the investment project.  
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determine entrepreneurs’ capabilities and uncover the actual quality of their projects. As 
mentioned later, this is made through screening in our model. Continuing with entrepreneurs, 
each of them is required to express his preference for a particular type of loan by travelling along 
the circumference at a per length transportation cost  >0 to reach the bank that satisfies his 
type.
5
 The idea behind is that entrepreneurs incur some disutility by conducting business with a 
bank that is not of their type. The distance d >0 that an entrepreneur covers to get to some 
particular bank is a measure of his disutility to buy a less-than-ideal product (for more on this 
point, see Schnitzer, 1999). It has to be mentioned here that τ should not be interpreted in strictly 
geographical terms. Instead, it should be viewed as some type of transaction cost that each credit 
applicant needs to pay in order to borrow from the bank of his taste. Subsequently, the total cost 
of buying one unit of money equals to the sum of the bank lending rate (see below) increased by 
the total transportation cost ( d  ) the entrepreneur has to sustain to reach the bank of his 
preference.  
Let us now turn to banks. The whole market consists of n≥k banks (with k being a positive 
integer), which -like entrepreneurs- are also symmetrically distributed on the unit circle.
6
 Banks 
are profit maximizers and compete in prices (loan interest rates) to attract heterogeneous 
entrepreneurs who invest in risky projects.
7
 As previously described, banks are faced with an 
informational problem in their lending decision as they do not know the exact type of their loan 
applicants and thus the quality of the proposed investment projects. They therefore proceed in 
screening applicant entrepreneurs to obtain their type. Since screening is a costly activity, a bank 
is capable of identifying the type of its applicants at a cost equal to ]1,0(e  per unit invested.8 
Following Manove et al. (2001), we assume that screening is non-contractible, so that banks 
cannot sell it to their customers as service; also, that the signal that banks receive from screening 
is strictly proprietary in that it is not observable to any of the other banks. In case information 
spillovers were assumed instead, a free-riding problem would arise, which would curtail the 
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 We thus introduce heterogeineity in preferences in the model. This is to say, preferences are assumed to be 
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6
 The assumption that n≥k safeguards that the number of banks in the market can increase to infinity, but cannot fall 
below some threshold value k. 
7
 To keep our analysis as simple as possible, we do not model competition on the deposit market assuming that the 
supply of deposits is perfectly elastic at an interest rate that is normalized to zero. 
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 The screening cost e can be alternatively viewed as bank’s effort to screen its loan applicants. Thus, a higher e 
corresponds to a more extensive screening effort.  
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incentives of banks to undertake screening. This, in turn, would possibly lead to an inefficient 
credit allocation.
9
 To continue, screening technology is perfect in the sense that the signal each 
bank receives is not noisy.
10
 To be more specific, we assume that banks have access to perfect 
screening technology only above some threshold value of e>>0 that may differ amongst banks, 
but all have an incentive to pay.
11
 Without this assumption, banks would prefer investing the 
smallest possible amount of money (i.e., 0e ) to screen their applicants, as they could obtain 
the entrepreneur’s true type with the lowest possible cost. Even more, the level of e is 
particularly relevant for the better understanding of our findings as it will become clear later in 
the paper.  
After distinguishing good from bad entrepreneurs through screening, banks proceed in price 
discriminate them by offering them a loan interest rate rθ chosen from the set {rl,, rh}.  The 
lending rate factor rθ encompasses two main components: the repayment probability of the loan 
pθ that reflects entrepreneurs’ creditworthiness, and the administrative cost of lending which is 
assumed to be constant for all types of entrepreneurs and independent of the distance d that 
separates banks from potential borrowers. Following Chiappori et al. (1995) and Hyytinen 
(2003), we assume that banks cannot observe the exact location of the entrepreneurs on the 
circle, which means that price discrimination is not location-based. Put simply, banks do not 
engage in spatial pricing. By being offered distinct rates, entrepreneurs learn the type that has 
been assigned to them and travel to the bank that satisfies their type to apply for credit.  
The time structure of the game is as follows. At stage 1, banks screen the applicant 
entrepreneurs and learn their type. Banks then compete for loan customers by simultaneously 
making them their price offers as appropriate. At stage 2, entrepreneurs observe the loan rates 
offered, and travel to the bank that offers the contract with the most favorable terms, i.e., the 
contract that is compatible with their type, to apply for credit.  
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3. Solution 
The game is solved by backward induction: we first solve Stage 2 and then Stage 1. As said 
before, in Stage 2, the entrepreneur views the interest rate offered by each bank and travels to the 
bank of his interest. For any given loan interest rate rθ the expected net return of an entrepreneur 
of type θ is: 12 
 
           drpRp  ])([    (1) 
 
We can now formulate entrepreneur θ’s participation constraint, which safeguards that every 
entrepreneur has an interest to participate in the loan market. Indeed, an entrepreneur applies for 
credit only if his expected net profit is nonnegative:  
 





])([
0])([
rpRp
ddrpRp

   (2) 
 
Since dθ>0 by definition, it must hold that 0
])([





rpRp
. It has been assumed that pθ and 
 are larger than zero, which implies that R(pθ)-rθ must also be larger than zero, i.e., R(pθ)>rθ. 
This last relation stands for the project’s viability constraint and shows that the return of an 
investment project must always outweigh the lending cost. In fact, condition R(pθ)>rθ ensures 
that relation (2) is not violated.  
Assuming that (2) holds with equality and solving for the distance variable dθ, we obtain: 
 
    




])([ rpRp
d

     (3) 
 
Equation (3) shows that it is not profitable for the entrepreneur to apply for a loan beyond dθ. 
Since entrepreneurs have learnt the type that has been assigned to them in the beginning of Stage 
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2 when banks have made them a price offer (either rh or rl), we can proceed in extracting the 
following two equations that are produced by (3) for each type of entrepreneurs:  
 
    

])([ hhh
h
rpRp
d

         (3a)  
 
    

])([ lll
l
rpRp
d

     (3b) 
 
Let us now turn to characterize the Nash equilibrium in the loan market. Our focus is 
restricted on symmetric equilibrium in location and interest rates.
13
 We mentioned before that 
each of the n banks makes a price offer to the set of potential borrowers. Without loss of 
generality, we assume that a typical bank j offers a rate jr , j=1,2, …, n and that the transportation 
cost  is small enough (but not equal to 0) for the banking market to be wholly covered. In this 
scheme of things, bank j is located equidistantly between banks j+1 and j-1 that charge 1jr  and 
1jr , respectively. An entrepreneur of type θ located at a distance ]/1,0( nd   from bank j is 
indifferent between borrowing from j and borrowing from its nearest neighbor, say j+1, if: 
 
          )
1
(])([])([ 1   d
n
rpRpdrpRp jj    (4) 
 
Relation (4) stands for the indifference condition of the game and shows the exact location of the 
type-θ marginal borrower.14 Solving (4) for d  yields: 
 
   



2
)(
2
1
),(
1
1
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jj rrp
n
rrd



    (5) 
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Hence, bank j faces the following demand for loans: 
 
         




)(1
2),(
1
1
jj
jjj rrp
n
drrL



    (6) 
 
From the expression 2 d  in (6), we can infer that there exist two marginal borrowers: one on the 
left, and one the right.  Also notice that for 1 jj rr  , we get that
1
2
d
n
  , which corresponds to 
the mid-point between the two adjacent banks j and j+1. Moreover, we obtain that
n
L j
1
 , which 
implies that the n banks would be equally sharing the borrower population. Like in the Salop’s 
(1979) model, the ratio 
n
1
 stands for a measure of bank’s market power.  
It is obvious from relation (6) that the loan demand function of bank j is declining in its own 
rate jr and increasing in its rival’s rate
1jr . This means that the bank j can attract a larger number 
of customers if it lowers its lending rate. The converse also holds true, i.e., an increase in the 
lending rate factor is enough to compel borrowers to move away from the relatively more 
expensive bank. Most importantly, neither the number of banks n, nor the level of transferring 
cost  vitiates the power of this finding. In other words, borrowers travel to the cheaper bank 
regardless of the degree of competition and the cost of traveling.  
As already said, each bank prices borrowers on the basis of their type. Consequently, for 
θ=h, the loan demand function (Eq. 6) takes the following form: 
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Correspondingly, for θ=l we get: 
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We now turn to consider Stage 1. The optimization problem of bank j can be viewed as 
choosing the optimal lending rates jhr
* and jlr
*  by appropriately pricing heterogeneous borrowers 
through the screening mechanism, given similar choices of the other banks. Bank j’s expected 
net returns per unit of loans granted to h-type and l-type borrowers are: 
 
    )1()( erqpru jhh
j
h
j
h       (7a)  
and  
)1()1()( erpqru jll
j
l
j
l      (7b) 
 
So, bank j solves the following maximization problem:  
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Substituting (6a), (6b), (7a), and (7b) into (8), we obtain: 
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We now move to differentiate the profit function with respect to jhr and 
j
lr . The symmetric price 
equilibrium is obtained by setting 1 jh
j
h rr  and 
1 jl
j
l rr (the proof is relegated to the 
Appendix): 
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Proposition 1 An increase in competition reduces the equilibrium loan rate no matter the type of 
the borrower.  
Proof The first order conditions of (10a) and (10b) with respect to n are 0
2
*



npn
r
h
h
j
h 
 and 
0
2
*



npn
r
l
l
j
l 
, respectively. Hence, both * jhr  and 
* j
lr  decrease with the number of banks n, 
which means that the level of competition is negatively related with the equilibrium lending rates 
regardless of the entrepreneurs’ type. This proposition is in line with the mainstream view that 
provides support to the negative relationship that holds between the degree of competition and 
the cost of lending. For instance, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) and De Nicolo and Loukoianova 
(2007) find that banks charge lower loan rates when competition is increased and this is a 
counter-incentive in the borrowers’ risk-taking decision. Whereas the effect of market structure 
on bank credit risk cannot be inferred from the present proposition, it can be argued, however, 
that competition’s impact on the equilibrium rates is uniform across the two types of borrowers, 
i.e., both good and bad entrepreneurs face lower rates under enhanced competition. In 
accordance, as competition increases, a larger number of entrepreneurs (of any type) are 
expected to enter the lending market attracted by the lower interest rates. That is, not only good 
but also bad projects with lower probability of success and thus higher risk are to be proposed to 
the banks for potential funding.  
 
 
Proposition 2 In high levels of competition transportation cost is irrelevant in the setting of the 
optimal loan rate 
Proof Again, by looking at the first order conditions of (10a) and (10b) with respect to the 
number of banks n, we can infer that when n>>0, we get that 0/ n where },{ lh . This 
means that in a very competitive loan market where n is sufficiently large, the particular type and 
level of transportation cost  plays no role in the optimal rate setting. Any additional bank entry 
that would drive the market further closer to perfect competition ( n ) would strengthen the 
power of this proposition ( 0/ n ).  
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Proposition 3 Screening serves as a buffer mechanism for banks against credit risk  
Proof Suppose there is the maximum possible heterogeneity between borrowers in the economy, 
i.e., .
2
1
q  Substituting 
2
1
q  to (10a) and (10b) produces jl
j
h rr
**  since 
lh
l
l
h
h
ppe
np
e
np
 )]1(2[
1
)]1(2[
1 
, which holds by assumption. The inequality 
j
l
j
h rr
**   implies that the bank offers a low loan interest rate jhr
* to good entrepreneurs with high-
quality projects and a higher loan rate equal to jlr
* to their bad counterparts. This happens 
because banks screen would-be borrowers and learn their type and thus the probability of success 
pθ of their investment projects. Since pθ, which is a component of rθ -together with the 
administrative cost of lending which, as mentioned above, remains unchanged between the two 
types of borrowers-, is lower for bad projects (i.e., pl<ph) , the bank charges bad borrowers with 
a higher rate in order to be protected against a higher credit risk. This is to say, screening is not 
only a useful tool for banks to price discriminate investment projects properly, but also an 
effective device against excessive risk-taking as it provides a buffer against loan losses.  
 
 
Proposition 4 Competition induces banks to invest more in screening 
Proof Relation (10a) can be written as follows:  
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If we compute the first derivative of the above equation with respect to n, we get: 
,
2n
q
n
e h


which is positive since ,0qh ( ,h q>0, by assumption).
15
 Hence, the greater the 
number of competitors in the banking market, the larger the screening cost that each one incurs. 
In simple terms, this proposition implies that banks invest more in screening technology when 
competition increases. Put differently, under mounting competition, banks are willing to pay a 
                                                 
15
 It is straightforward that we obtain the same results if, following the same process, we differentiate (10b) -instead 
of (10a)- with respect to n.  
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higher test cost e to obtain the true type of their credit applicants. That is, the threshold value of e 
for each bank which ensures the perfect screening outcome increases due to intense competition. 
The present proposition is in agreement with the results of the studies of Hainz et al. (2008) and 
Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999), but stands in sharp contrast to those of Manove et al. 
(2001), Hauswald and Marquez (2006) and Lehner and Schnitzer (2008) who find that intense 
competition reduces the rents of banks and decreases their overall incentives to screen their 
credit applicants. The proposition is also in direct conflict with the view of Cetorelli and Peretto 
(2000), who, though relying upon the assumption that screening information is transferable and 
not proprietary (like in the current analysis), demonstrate that competition negatively affects 
banks’ willingness to generate information.  
 
 
4. Discussion 
In this section, we synopsize the key results found in the above analysis and discuss their main 
implications. To begin with, our results provide support to the view that a bank which reduces its 
lending rate can increase its market share by poaching customers from other banks that turn out 
to be relatively more expensive.
16
 Conversely, the initiative of a bank to raise its loan rate shrinks 
bank’s clientele that seeks to travel to some relatively cheaper bank. Notably, the current 
implication is independent of the degree of competition in the banking market. In addition, the 
power of this implication is not restricted in the neighborhood of the cheaper institutions. This is 
to say, transportation cost plays no role in the decision of entrepreneurs to travel to (move away 
from) a bank that decreases (increases) its lending rates.  
Our findings also suggest that competition has a considerable impact on the cost at which 
credit is available. In particular, a decreasing relationship between the number of banks and the 
level of equilibrium lending rates is reported. Hence, a larger number of banks give rise to 
intensive price competition in the banking market, which ends up lowering credit cost. 
Interestingly, all borrowers can potentially take advantage of this reduction. To sum up, the 
interest rate paid by either type of borrower decreases as the market structure of the banking 
sector becomes more competitive.   
                                                 
16
 The rationale behind borrower poaching can be traced in the study of Bouckaert and Degryse (2006) as well as 
that of Hauswald and Marquez (2006). 
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To continue, the importance of transportation cost in the setting of the equilibrium loan rates 
declines as the number of banks increases. The lowering significance of transportation cost as a 
result of fierce competition coupled with the previous finding indicates that competition reduces 
loan interest rates since it shrinks the average distances between all possible combinations of 
borrowers and neighboring banks. Overall, as the cost of lending declines more entrepreneurs are 
expected to enter the market, which implies that intensified competition leads to a greater 
openness in the loan market.  
Moreover, we document an increase in banks’ screening cost as a result of the increased 
competition in the lending market.
17
 The interpretation to be placed upon this finding is that the 
level of credit risk that banks are dealing with in a competitive industry tends to be higher. This 
occurs because banks are more prone to make mistakes in their lending decisions as the number 
of credit applicants (and thus of bad applicants) increases due to intensified competition (as 
mentioned in the previous paragraph). If banks are to be protected from taking more credit risk, 
they have to invest a higher amount in screening technology. This is to say, screening is the 
device that banks can use to efficiently collect borrower-specific information. Screening acts as a 
buffer mechanism against credit risk which becomes higher due to the enhanced presence of bad 
entrepreneurs in the lending market. Our interpretation here is reinforced by the view of Acharya 
et al. (2006) according to which the informational effectiveness of financial institutions is lower 
in highly competitive markets. As a consequence, banks become more willing to incur a higher 
screening cost so as to maintain the quality of information production. 
To sum up, our results demonstrate that market structure, bank lending behavior, and the 
incentives of banks to invest in information acquisition are strongly interrelated. In particular, we 
document that a competitive banking industry provides cheaper credit to potential borrowers by 
setting lower loan rates. Regarding the number of would-be borrowers, it is expected to be larger 
compared to that in less competitive markets. By dealing with a larger number of loan applicants, 
banks invest more in screening technology to be protected from bad applicants, who entail higher 
credit risk.   
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 We acknowledge that several other factors like, for example, the composition of loans, bank size, and ownership 
status might also have an influence on screening incentives. However, the present analysis focuses on the link 
between industry structure and the screening activity of banks. An investigation of the relevance of other factors -
like those mentioned above- is rather out of the scope of our analysis and is thus left as an exercise for the interested 
reader.  
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5. Concluding remarks 
One of the not well-defined relations in the banking literature is that between market structure, 
bank lending behavior and screening activity. In this paper, we make an attempt to partly fill this 
literature gap by employing a model of spatial competition that incorporates the informational 
asymmetries which exist between banks and potential borrowers in order to examine the impact 
of industry structure on the lending behavior of banking institutions as well as on the screening 
technology that these institutions use to soften the information problem they are faced with. 
     Several appealing results are delivered which demonstrate that market structure, bank lending 
behavior, and banks’ incentives to invest in screening are largely interlinked. First, we find that a 
bank can extend its market share by lowering its lending rate. The idea behind this result is rather 
straightforward: a cheaper bank poaches customers from its competitors thus gaining a 
substantial share in the market. We further provide support to the mainstream view that greater 
competition reduces lending cost. Yet, what is more enlightening in this finding is that 
competition exerts a negative effect on the price of credit for all types of entrepreneurs in our 
model, that is both good and bad ones. In addition, we document that transportation cost 
becomes less important in the setting of the equilibrium loan rates as competition increases. By 
taking a more holistic view of the previous two results, we could argue that our analysis provides 
support to the view that competition has a downward effect on the equilibrium loan rates 
whereas at the same time it makes easier for potential borrowers to travel to the banks that satisfy 
their type as it reduces transaction costs. This fall in the total cost of credit favors the access of 
an increased number of entrepreneurs to the loan market.  
Importantly, we show that banks invest more in screening as a result of higher competition. 
The explanation we offer is that banks are more easily mistaken in their lending decision as the 
number of credit applicants increases due to enhanced competition. Therefore, banks resort to 
screening as they try to get protected against bad entrepreneurs who incur higher credit risk. 
Overall, in this paper we provide strong theoretical evidence of a clear link that exists between 
market structure, bank lending, and screening which has a direct influence on the risk-taking 
behavior of banks and which is very likely to also affect bank performance when measured in 
terms of loan productivity and profitability.    
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Appendix 
Relation (9) can be written as follows: 
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To obtain bank j’s optimal loan interest rate for the h-type borrowers, we calculate the first order 
conditions of (I) with respect to jhr : 
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To obtain the symmetric Nash equilibrium we set 1 jh
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We work in a similar way to get the optimal loan rate for the l-type borrowers: 
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We now set 1 jl
j
l rr : 
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